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Abstract. A public-key cryptosystem based on iterated morphisms and substitutions was intro- 
duced in 1983 by Salomaa and W&l. The present paper studies this system further. Finding a 
standard key, that is, finding a decryption key like the secret one used by the designer of the 
system is the preprocessing method one first thinks of. This approach is shown to lead to an 
NP-hard problem. The important aspect of growth of the cryptotext with respect to the plaintext 
is also discussed. A simple tool to guarantee polynomiai growth is given. Finally, a natural 
extension of the system, intuitively increasing its security, is presented. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper a public-key cryptosystem based on iterated morphisms and substitu- 
tions is studied. The system was originally presented in [5] and it has been further 
investigated in several papers, including [2] and [6]. 
Let us first recall the system. Consider an alphabet C and two morphisms 
ho,hl:Z*+Z*. Let w be a word in J5 *. These items form a DTOL system G = 
(2, ho, hl , w) (see [3] for the terminology of L systems). Take another alphabet A 
and a morphism g:A*+X* mapping every letter of A to a letter of C or to the 
empty word h. The mapping g is called an interpretation morphism. Letters that g 
maps to the empty word h are dummy symbols, while letters that are mapped to a 
letter Q of C are descendants of a. For each letter a of C there should be at least 
one dexendant of Q in A. 
Let a0 nd q be two finite substitutions on A. For every letter d in A and index 
i E (0, 1) the language q(d) is a finite nonempty set of words x with the property 
g(X) = hi&(d))* 
Finally, let u be 2 word in A* such that 
g(u) = w. 
(0 
(2) 
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The quadruple W = (d, 00, cl, u) is a TOL system. It constitutes the public encryp- 
tion key. The encryption of a sequence ioir . . . in, where each ik is either 0 or 1, is 
done by choosing an arbitrary word from the set 
(u)q)q . . . ai,,. (3) 
The secret decryption key consists of the DTOL-system G and the ins “E pretation 
morphism g. If c is any word in the set (3) then, because of (1) and (2), 
g(c)=(w)h,hi, l l l hi,,. (4) 
The decryption of the cryptotext c is carried out by finding the sequence iOil . . . in 
satisfying (4). The sequence should of course be unique. Therefore the DTOL system 
G is required to be backward eterministic, that is, the condition 
(w)h,hi, l l l hi,, = Cw) hjohj, l l l hj,,, 
always implies 
i& . . . in = j,j, . . . j,. 
If we want the decryption to be easy as well we may require that the DTOL system 
G is strongb backward deterministic. This means that if c = (w)h,hi, . . . hi,, and 
c = h&) for some word x in Z*, then 
k=i,, and X=(w)hbhi,. . . hi,,_,. 
Every word generated by a strongly backward deterministic DTOL system has a 
unique predecessor. 
In Section 2 we study the safety of this system. It was demonstrated in [6] how 
the security of the system highly depends on the difficulty of finding the dummy 
symbols. An interpretation morphism g and a DTOL system G can be easily 
constructed, provided the dummy symbols can be found. It remained open whether 
finding dummy symbols is an NP-complete problem. We show that the answer is 
positive. Moreover, we show that constructing and G is NP-hard. 
An important aspect is the growth of the public TOL system. Naturally WC prefer 
short cryptotexts. This is the topic in Section 3. We give an easy characterization 
of a large group of polynomially growing TOL systems. This appears useful in 
constructing public TOL systems. 
Section 4 describes a possible extension of the system. As mentioned earlier, 
finding dummy symbols breaks the system. This is in general NP-hard, but in many 
cases it can be done quite easily. In our extension, finding dummies is no longer 
sufficient for a successful cryptanalysis. 
2. Constructing standard keys 
After the TOL system H is published there might be a long time before any 
important messages are encrypted. During this period the cryptanalyst may try to 
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break the system by preprocessing, that is, by finding a fast decryption method on 
the basis of H only. The most obvious approach is to try to construct an interpretation 
morphism g and a corresponding secret DTOL system G, and thereafter make use 
of the decryption algorithm used by the IeGdl recipient. This approach is called 
constructing a standard key. There may be several different standard keys. However, 
to construct even one of them turns out to be NP-hard. 
Theorem 1. It if NP-hard to construct for a given TOL system H = (A, oo, ol, u) a 
nontrivial interpretation morphism g : A * + C * mapping H to a DTOL system C = 
(2, ho, hl, w). This means g must satisfy the following four conditions: 
(a) for each letter d in A, g(d) is either a letter in C or the empty word h, 
(b) there exists a letter d in A such that g(d) is a letter in Z, 
(c) for every letter d in A, index i E (0, 1) and word x in oi(d), g(x) = hi(g(d)), 
(d) g(u) = w= 
The problem remains NP-hard if we restrict ourselves to TOL systems known to be 
based on strongly backward deterministic DTOL systems. 
Proof. We make a reduction from a modification of the satisfiability problem for 
propositional calculus. Given a formula in conjunctive normal form, one should 
decide whether or not there exists a truth value assignment that makes exactly one 
literal true in every clause. This problem is NP-complete even if we assume that 
there are no negated literals in the formula (see one-in-three satisfiability in [7] or 
the problem (L04) in [ 11). It is easy to see the NP-hardness of the corresponding 
search problem: construct a truth value assignment with the property stated above 
when we know the existence of such an assignment. 
Let X=(x1,x2,..., xn} be a variable set and let 
be a formula of propositional calculus, where each clause Ci is a disjunction of 
some variables in X. We assume there exists a truth value assignment a! : X + {T, F} 
that yields exactly one true variable in each clause Ci. We show how to construct 
a TOL system H such that each interpretation morphism of H directly produces a 
solution to the modified satisfiability problem of L. Moreover, the existence of the 
solution a! guarantees that there is a morphism that maps H into a strongly backward 
deterministic DTOL system. 
The alphabet of the TOL system H will be A = {S, 0, 1) u X u Ox u lx, where 
lx ={lx)x~X} and Ox ={O,IXEX}. 
For each clause C = xi1 v Xi2 v . l l v Xi,, over the variables of X -Ne define a word f (C) 
in Xx’ by 
f( Xi, V Xi2 V ’ ’ ’ V Xi,, ) = Xi, Xi, l m l Xi,, l 
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The substitutions a0 and ol can now be defined: 
UO(S)={SO}U{f(Ci)O~~= 1, l l l 9 m), 
co(x) =(x0,} for each x E X, 
O,(X) = (xl,} for each x E X, 
co(O) = o*(O) = (01, ~o(l)=ol(l)=W, 
~~(0,) = o,(O,) = (0,) for each x E X and 
~~(l,)=o,(l,)={l,} for each XEX 
The initial wcrd is S, so we obtain a TOL system H = (A, no, q , S). 
First we prove that there exists an interpretation morphism g mapping the TOL 
system H into a strongly backward deterministic DTOL system G. The system G is 
a quadruple ((A, 0, l}, ho, hl , A), where 
ho(A) = AO, h,(A) = Al, 
h,(O) = h,(O) =0 and h,(l) = h,(l) = 1. 
System G is obviously strongly backward deterministic. It is also a possible 
interpretation of H. A possible interpretation morphism g : A * + {A, 0, 1)” is defined 
bY 
g(S) = A, g(O) = 0, g(1) = 1. 
For each x E X, 
if (u(x) = T, then 
if a(x) = F, then g(x) = g(0,) = g( 1,) = x. 
Because in every clause Ci of L there is exactly one true variable under the truth 
value assignment cy, we have g(f( Ci)) = A. So the morphism g apparently satisfies 
the conditions (a) through (d). 
Next we show that every interpretation morphism of H yields a solution to the 
modified satisfiability problem for L. Therefore, let G = (2, ho, hl , w) be any DTOL 
system and let g : A* + C* be a morphism satisfying the conditions (a)-(d) in the 
theorem. If g(S) = h, then every letter in A is a dummy symbol, which violates (b). 
Thus, g(S) equals some letter of 2, say A. Because very word in so(S) is mapped 
into same word by g, we have g(f( Ci)) = A for each clause Ci in L. If we define a 
truth value assignment /3 on X by 
P(x)=T iff g(x)=A, 
p makes exactly one variable in each Ci true. So p constitutes a solution of the 
modified satisfiability problem for t. 
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Since the construction of the TOL system H can be accomplished in polynomial 
time, the theorem follows. Cl 
In [6] it was shown that a standard key can be constructed in polynomial time 
if we know the dummy symbols. So, an immediate corollary of Theorem 1 says that 
finding dummy symbols is NP-hard. 
The TOL systems used in the proof of Theorem 1 were all based on the same 
DTOL system G = ({A, 0, l}, ho, hl, A). Consequently, finding the interpretation 
morphism remains NP-hard even if the secret DTOL system is known to the crypt- 
analyst. 
The TOL systems in the proof were all polynomially, even linearly, growing. 
Therefore, the NP-hardness remains valid if we restrict ourselves to linearly growing 
systems. The TOL systems used are also contained in the more restricted class of 
polynomially growing systems generable by the method presented in Section 3 
below. In other respects the theorem is stated in a very strong form: the TOL system 
was supposed to be based on a strongly backward deterministic DTOL system while 
the DTOL system in the standard key was allowed to be of any kind. It is clear that 
the theorem is valid if we assume the system is based only on a backward eterministic 
or strictly backward deterministic DTOL system (see [6] for different versions of 
backward determinism). 
One should be aware of the fact that the theorem says nothing about other possible 
cryptanalytic methods. This is obvious if we consider the TOL systems used in the 
proof. Their cryptanalysis is trivial because the substitutions used can be directly 
seen in the cryptotext. The polynomial-time 
backward deterministic systems in [2] is in no 
cryptanalysis method for strongly 
way contradictory to Theorem 1. 
3. Polynomially growing TOL systems 
A desirable property for a cryptosystem is that the cryptotext does not considerably 
exceed the plaintext in length. In the system we study, this is not a crucial topic 
because in case of too long cryptotexts we can always divide the plaintext into 
smaller blocks. However, shorter blocks may ruin the security of the system. It is 
better to design the TOL system carefully to avoid exponential growth. In [6] the 
attention is focused on the average growth of the system. Here we take a more 
restrictive approach and consider the worst case growth of TOL systems. 
Let H be the public TOL system. We say H is polynomially growing if there exists 
a polynomial p such that any plaintext of length n can be encrypted only to 
cryptotexts of length at most p(n) using H. Otherwise system H is exponentially 
growing. The following theorem characterizes a class of polynomially growing TOL 
systems. 
Theorem 2. Let H = (A, co, q , u) be a TOL system. Su;pss2 th2re is a function f from 
the alphabet A into the set of natural numbers N satisfying the following two ctonditions 
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for each letter d in A and word dld2 . . . d, in q(d): 
f(d)sf(d,) for each j, Isjsn, and (9 
f(d)=f(d,) foratmostonej, lsjsn. (6) 
Then the TOL system H is polynomially growing. Moreover, for each letter d in A the 
number of occurrences of d in any cryptotext, produced by a plaintext of length n, is 
at most pd(n), where pd is a pOlynO?IIid Of degree at most yf(d ). 
Proof. Suppose there is a function f: A + IV satisfying conditions (5) and (6). We 
prove the existence of the polynomials JQ using induction on f(d). The polynomial 
growth of H follows immediately. 
Let us denote for all natural numbers k 
Ak={d~AIf(d)=k} and B,-GA.. J 
j=O 
(1) Suppose f(d) = 0. It follows from (5) and (6) that, for any words x and y in 
A* where y E U&X), the total number of letters of A0 in y is at most their number 
in X. So, the total number of d’s in any cryptotext is at most the number of letters 
of A0 in the initial word u. 
(2) Suppose the claim is proved for all letters in S,. Consequently, there exists 
a polynomial q of degree at most k such that the number of letters of Bk in any 
cryptotext, obtained from a plaintext of length n, is at most q(n). Let d be a letter 
of &+I. 
Let u=w,andlet wo,wl,..., w, be a sequence of words 31 A*, following each 
other through the substitutions of the system, that is, for each j, 0 <j G n - 1, either 
Wi+i e cO(wj) or wj+l E 01( wi)’ In every word wj the number of letters of & is at 
most q(j). Let s denote the number of letters of A k+l in the initial word u, and let 
t be the maximum number of letters of A k+l in the words of the languages ai( 
where a E Bk and i E (0, 1). Then, by the conditions (5) and (6), the number of letters 
of Ak+l can increase by at most t l q(j) from Wj to Wj+l . So the polynomial pd may 
be defined as 
n-l 
pd(n)=s+t* jgo q(j)* 
This is a polynomial of degree at most k + 1. Cl 
Note that the existence of the function f in the theorem above is not a necessary 
condition for polynomial growth. A counterexample is given by the DTOL system 
PI = ({a, b, c, d}, ho, h,, a) where 
h,(a) = bc, h,(a) = bc, 
ho(b) = a, h(b) = 4 
ho(c) = 4 h(c) = a, 
A,(d) = d, h,(d) = d. 
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Suppose w is a word including at most one u, one 6 and one c. Because 
hO( abc) = bead, hl (abc) = bcda, and hO( d ) and h 1 (d ) do not contain letters a, b or 
c, there cannot be more than one a, b and c in the words h,(w) and h,(w). 
Consequently, the words generated by H have at most one letter a, one b and one 
c. The number of d’s grows linearly. Yet, there does not exist a function f satisfying 
(5) and (6). Since ho(u) = bc, the condition (5) implies f(a) sf( b) and f(a) cf( c). 
On the other hand, h,(b) = a and h,(c) = a imply f’(b) +(a) and f(c) sf(a). So 
f(a)=f(b) =f( ), h h c w ic violates (6) since h,(a) = bc. 
It is not difficult to see that the existence of a function f with the properties (5) 
and (6) is necessary for polynomial growth in case of a OL system, that is, if the 
TOL system has only one substitution instead of two. 
The class of TOL systems characterized by Theorem 2 is quite large, although it 
does not contain all polynomially growing systems. Particularly, the TOL systems 
used in the proof of Theorem 1 are included. This means that the problem of finding 
standard keys for TOL systems of Theorem 2 is NP-hard. 
Theorem 2 is motivated by the need of a simple method to generate slowly growing 
public TOE systems from given secret DTOL systems. This goal is well reached. 
Suppose one is given a secret DTOL system G and assume G satisfies the conditions 
of Theorem 2. To construct a corresponding TOL system one selects an alphabet A 
and an arbitrary mapping f : A + N. The degree of tha polynomial growth of the TOL 
system will be at most the maximum of the images of the letters in A. If one wants 
to make sure of, say, linear growth, the images should be restricted to 0 and 1. 
When finally generating the interpretation morphism and the substitutions ~0 and 
cl, one only has to see that the conditions (5) and (6) are not violated. 
4. A generalization of the cryptosystem 
As we remember, the security of the cryptosystem highly depends on the difficulty 
of finding dummy symbols. While in general this is an NP-hard problem, in many 
cases dummies can be found easily. This is due to the fact that all the letters reachable 
from a dummy symbol are dummies themselves. To preserve the security one has 
to design the TOL systems carefully. Another approach is to generalize the cryptosys- 
tern as described below. After the generalization, finding dummy symbols is no 
longer sufficient for a successful cryptanalysis. 
The interpretation morphism g : A *+ C* was defined as a morphism from the 
alphabet A of the TOL system to the alphabet C of the secret DTOL system satisfying 
conditions 
(7) g(d) E C u {h} for each letter d in A, and 
(8) for each letter c1 in Z; a = g(d) for some letter d in A. 
Condition (7) is however superfluous. The interpretation morphism may as well be 
defined as any surjective morphism g : A* + C *. The TOL system H = (A, ao, q ) u) 
is defined as before. The start word u is any word mapped by g to w, the start word 
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of the secret DTOL system. The sets ai consist of words x such that g(x) = 
hi(g(d)). Accordingly, for any words x and y in A*, if y E gi(x) then g(y) = hi(g(x)). 
This means that the decryption of a cryptotext c can be done as before by first 
comprvting (c) and then finding the sequence of morphisms transforming the start 
word w into g(c). 
Let us illustrate this by the following example. Let C = {a, b} and define two 
morphisms ho and h, by 
h,,:a+ab, b-, b, 
Choose ab as the start word. So we obtain the secret DTOL system G = (Z, ho, h, , ab). 
Let A = {cl, c2, c3 , c4, c5}. The interpretation morphism g may now be defined for 
instance by 
g : cl + ab, Cz-,h, C3-) b, c4+ ba, Cs+ Q. 
Choose u = cIc2 and define two substitutions o. and o1 by 
a0 : c1 + C2ClC3, CSC3C3, u1 : Cl + Cl% C2CSC4, 
C2+ C2, C23 C2C2, 
c3 + C3C2, C3+ C4C2, C3C5, 
c4 + C3C2Cl) C4C3 9 C4 + C2C4C5 3 
C53 C2C1, C5C3, cg+ c2c5. 
For instance, h,(g( c,)) = h,( ab) = abb = g( c2c1 c3). The other substitutes are shown 
to be correct similarly. A possible cryptotext corresponding to plaintext 101 is 
obtained by the derivation 
ClC2 +l C2CSC4 C2C2 +O C2 C5C3 C4C3 C2 C2 
+l C2C2 C2C5 C4C2 C2C4C5 C3C5 C2C2 C2C2 = Cm 
The legal recipient is able to compute g(c) = ababaaba, and thereafter find the 
plaintext 
h,(abbab) = ababaaba, 
h,(aba) = abbab, h&b) = aba. 
The preprocessing method in [6] to find the standard key if the dummy symbols 
are known does not work any more. The synchronism on the right-hand sides of 
the substitutions is now disturbed, not only by the dummy letters, but by other 
letters as well. This seems to make the cryptanalysis harder. Nevertheless, the method 
for cryptanalysis in [2] is not affected. 
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